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Abstract
We model Monroe’s and Chamberlin and Courant’s multiwinner voting systems as
a certain resource allocation problem. We show that for many restricted variants of
this problem, under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions, there are no constant-
factor approximation algorithms. Yet, we also show cases where good approximation
algorithms exist (briefly put, these variants correspond to optimizing total voter sat-
isfaction under Borda scores, within Monroe’s and Chamberlin and Courant’s voting
systems).
1 Introduction
Resource allocation is one of the most important issues in multiagent systems, equally
important both to human societies and to artificial software agents [29]. For example, if
there is a set of items (or a set of bundles of items) to distribute among agents then we may
use one of many auction mechanisms (see, e.g., [22,29] for an introduction and a review,
and numerous recent papers on auction theory for current results). However, typically in
auctions if an agent obtains an item (a resource) then this agent has exclusive access to
it. In this paper we consider resource allocation for items that can be shared, and we are
interested in computing (approximately) optimal assignments (in particular, for settings
where resource allocation boils down to multiwinner voting). As opposed to a large body
of research on auctions, resource allocation, and mechanism design, we do not make any
strategic considerations.
Let us explain our resource allocation problem through an example. Consider a company
that wants to provide free sport classes to its employees. We have a set N = {1, . . . , n} of
employees and a set A = {a1, . . . , am} of classes that are offered. Naturally, not every class
is equally appealing to each employee and, thus, each employee orders the classes from the
most desirable one to the least desirable one. For example, the first employee might have
preference order a1 ≻ a3 ≻ · · · ≻ am, meaning that for him or her a1 is the most attractive
class, a3 is second, and so on, until am, which is least appealing. Further, each class ai has
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some maximum capacity capai , that is, a maximum number of people that can comfortably
participate, and a cost, denoted cai , of opening the class (independent of the number of
participants). The company wants to assign the employees to the classes so that it does not
exceed its sport-classes budget B and so that the employees’ satisfaction is maximal (or,
equivalently, their dissatisfaction is minimal).
There are many ways to measure (dis)satisfaction. For example, we may measure an
employee’s dissatisfaction as the position of the class to which he or she was assigned in
his or her preference order (and satisfaction as m less the voter’s dissatisfaction). Then,
we could demand that, for example, the maximum dissatisfaction of an employee is as
low as possible (minimal satisfaction is as high as possible; in economics this corresponds
to egalitarian social welfare) or that the sum of dissatisfactions is minimal (the sum of
satisfactions is maximal; this corresponds to the utilitarian approach in economics).
It turns out that our model generalizes two well-known multiwinner voting rules; namely,
those of Monroe [20] and of Chamberlin and Courant [8]. Under both these rules voters
from the set N submit preference orders regarding alternatives from the set A, and the goal
is to select K candidates (the representatives) best representing the voters. For simplicity,
let us assume that K divides ‖N‖.1 Under Monroe’s rule we have to match each selected
representative to ‖N‖
K
voters so that each voter has a unique representative and so that the
sum of voters’ dissatisfactions is minimal (dissatisfaction is, again, measured by the position
of the representative in the voter’s preference order). Chamberlin and Courant’s rule is
similar except that there are no restrictions on the number of voters a given alternative
represents (in this case it is better to think of the alternatives as political parties rather
than particular politicians). It is easy to see that both methods are special cases of our
setting: For example, for Monroe it suffices to set the “cost” of each alternative to be 1, to
set the budget to be K, and to set the “capacity” of each alternative to be ‖N‖
K
. We can
consider variants of these two systems using different measures of voter (dis)satisfaction, as
indicated above (see also the works of Potthoff and Brams [24], Betzler et al. [4] and of Lu
and Boutilier [19]).
Unfortunately, it is well-known that both Monroe’s method and Chamberlin and
Courant’s method are NP-hard to compute in essentially all nontrivial settings [4,19,25].
This holds even if various natural parameters of the election are low [4]. Notable exceptions
include, e.g., the case where K is bounded by a fixed constant and the case where voter
preferences are single-peaked [4].
Nonetheless, Lu and Boutilier [19]—starting from a very different motivation and
context—propose to rectify the high computational complexity of Chamberlin and Courant’s
system by designing approximation algorithms. In particular, they show that if one focuses
on the sum of voters’ satisfactions, then there is a polynomial-time approximation algo-
rithm with approximation ratio (1− 1
e
) ≈ 0.63 (i.e., their algorithm outputs an assignment
1We stress that this assumption does not really affect our results. Our algorithms would maintain
their quality without the assumption. On the other hand, without the assumption modeling Monroe’s
and Chamberlin and Courant’s systems would be more tedious and some calculations would be a bit more
involved.
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that achieves no less than about 0.63 of optimal voter satisfaction). Unfortunately, total
satisfaction is a tricky measure. For example, under standard Chamberlin and Courant’s
system, a 12 -approximation algorithm is allowed to match each voter to an alternative some-
where in the middle of this voter’s preference order, even if there is a feasible solution that
matches each voter to his or her most preferred candidate. On the other hand, it seems that
a 2-approximation focusing on total dissatisfaction would give results of very high quality.
The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of our resource allocation scenario,
focusing on approximation algorithms for the special cases of Monroe’s and Chamberlin
and Courant’s voting systems. We obtain the following results:
1. Monroe’s and Chamberlin and Courant’s systems are hard to approximate up to any
constant factor for the case where we measure dissatisfaction, irrespective of whether
we measure the total dissatisfaction (Theorems 1 and 3) or the dissatisfaction of the
most dissatisfied voter (Theorems 2 and 4).
2. Monroe’s and Chamberlin and Courant’s systems are hard to approximate within
any constant factor for the case where we measure satisfaction of the least satisfied
voter (Theorems 5 and 7). However, there are good approximation algorithms for total
satisfaction—for the Monroe’s system we achieve approximation ratio arbitrarily close
to 0.715 (and often a much better one; see Section 4.1). For Chamberlin and Courant’s
system we give a polynomial-time approximation scheme (that is, for each ǫ, 0 < ǫ < 1,
we have a polynomial-time (1− ǫ)-approximation algorithm; see Theorem 13).
Our work is similar to several lines of research on computational social choice and
multiagent systems. In particular, there is a well-established line of work on the hardness
and approximability of winner determination for single-winner voting rules, with results for,
for example, Dodgson’s rule [3,6,7,12,15], Kemeny’s rule [1,3,10,16,17], Young’s rule [6,27],
and Ranked Pairs method [5]. Hardness of winner determination for multiwinner voting
rules was studied by Procaccia, Rosenschein, and Zohar [25], by Lu and Boutilier [19],
and by Betzler, Slinko and Uhlman [4]. Lu and Boutilier, while starting from a different
context, initiated the study of approximation algorithms in this setting, which we continue
and extend in this paper.
In the context of resource allocation, our model closely resembles multi-unit resource
allocation with single-unit demand [29, Chapter 11] (see also the work of Chevaleyre et
al. [9] for a survey of the most fundamental issues in the multiagent resource allocation
theory). The problem of multi-unit resource allocation is mostly addressed in the context
of auctions (and so it is referred in the literature as multi-unit auctions); in contrast, we
consider the problem of finding a solution maximizing the social welfare given the agents’
preferences. More generally, our model, is similar to resource allocation with sharable
indivisible goods [2,9]. The most substantial difference is that we require each agent to be
assigned to exactly one alternative. Also, in the context of resource allocation with sharable
items, it is often assumed that the agents’ satisfaction is affected by the number of agents
using the alternatives (the congestion on the alternatives). This forms a class of problems
that are closely related to congestion games [26]. Finally, it is worth mentioning that in the
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literature on resource allocation it is common to consider other criteria of optimality, such
as envy-freeness [18], Pareto optimality, Nash equilibria [2], and others.
Finally, we should mention that our paper is very close in spirit (especially in terms
of the motivation of the resource allocation problem) to the recent work of Darmann et
al. [11].
2 Preliminaries
We first define basic notions such as, e.g., preference orders and positional scoring rules.
Then we present our resource allocation problem in full generality and discuss restrictions
modeling Monroe’s and Chamberlin and Courant’s voting systems. Finally, we briefly recall
relevant notions regarding computational complexity theory.
Alternatives, Profiles, Positional Scoring Functions. For each n ∈ N, we take [n] to
mean {1, . . . , n}. We assume that there is a set N = [n] of agents and a set A = {a1, . . . am}
of alternatives. Each agent i has weight wi ∈ N, and each alternative a has capacity capa ∈ N
and cost ca ∈ N. The weight of an agent corresponds to its size (measured in some abstract
way). An alternative’s capacity gives the total weight of the agents that can be assigned to
it, and its cost gives the price of selecting the alternative (the price is the same irrespective of
the weight of the agents assigned to the alternative). Further, each agent i has a preference
order ≻i over A, i.e., a strict linear order of the form aπ(1) ≻i aπ(2) ≻i · · · ≻i aπ(m) for
some permutation π of [m]. For an alternative a, by posi(a) we mean the position of a
in i’th agent’s preference order. For example, if a is the most preferred alternative for
i then posi(a) = 1, and if a is the most despised one then posi(a) = m. A collection
V = (≻1, . . . ,≻n) of agents’ preference orders is called a preference profile. We write L(A)
to denote the set of all possible preference orders over A. Thus, for preference profile V of
n agents we have V ∈ L(A)n.
In our computational hardness proofs, we will often include subsets of alternatives in
the descriptions of preference orders. For example, if A is the set of alternatives and B
is some nonempty strict subset of A, then by saying that some agent has preference order
of the form B ≻ A − B, we mean that this agent ranks all the alternatives in B ahead of
all the alternatives outside of B, and that the order in which this agent ranks alternatives
within B and within A−B is irrelevant (and, thus, one can assume any easily computable
order).
A positional scoring function (PSF) is a function αm : [m] → N. A PSF αm is an
increasing positional scoring function (IPSF) if for each i, j ∈ [m], if i < j then αm(i) <
α(j). Analogously, a PSF αm is a decreasing positional scoring function (DPSF) if for each
i, j ∈ [m], if i < j then αm(i) > αm(j).
Intuitively, if βm is an IPSF then βm(i) gives the dissatisfaction that an agent suffers
from when assigned to an alternative that is ranked i’th on his or her preference order. Thus,
we assume that for each IPSF βm it holds that βm(1) = 0 (an agent is not dissatisfied by
his or her top alternative). Similarly, a DPSF γm measures an agent’s satisfaction and we
assume that for each DPSF γm it holds that γm(m) = 0.
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We will often speak of families α of IPSFs (DPSFs) of the form {αm | m ∈
N, αm is a PSF}, where the following holds:
1. For IPSFs, for each m ∈ N it holds that (∀i ∈ [m])[αm+1(i) = αm(i)].
2. For DPSFs, for each m ∈ N it holds that (∀i ∈ [m])[αm+1(i+ 1) = αm(i)].
In other words, we build our families of IPSFs (DPSFs) by appending (prepending) values
to functions with smaller domains. We assume that each function αm from a family can be
computed in polynomial time with respect to m. To simplify notation, we will refer to such
families of IPSFs (DPSFs) as normal IPSFs (normal DPSFs).
We are particularly interested in normal IPSFs (normal DPSFs) corresponding to the
Borda count method. That is, in the families of IPSFs αmB,inc(i) = i− 1 (in the families of
DPSFs αmB,dec(i) = m− i).
Our Resource Allocation Problem. We consider a problem of finding function Φ :
N → A that assigns each agent to some alternative (we will call Φ an assignment function).
We say that Φ is feasible if for each alternative a it holds that the total weight of the agents
assigned to it does not exceed its capacity capa. Further, we define the cost of assignment
Φ to be cost(Φ) =
∑
a:Φ−1(a)6=∅ ca.
Given an IPSF (DPSF) αm, we consider two dissatisfaction functions, ℓα1 (Φ) and ℓ
α
∞(Φ),
(two satisfaction functions, ℓα1 (Φ) and min
α(Φ)), measuring the quality of the assignment
as follows:
1. ℓα1 (Φ) =
∑n
i=1 α(posi(Φ(i))).
2. ℓα∞(Φ) = max
n
i=1α(posi(Φ(i))) (or, min
α(Φ) = minni=1α(posi(Φ(i)))).
The former one measures agents’ total dissatisfaction (satisfaction), whereas the latter one
considers the most dissatisfied (the least satisfied) agent only. In welfare economics and
multiagent resource allocation theory the two metrics correspond to, respectively, utilitarian
and egalitarian social welfare. We define our resource allocation problem as follows.
Definition 1. Let α be a normal IPSF. An instance of α-Assignment-Inc problem consists
of a set of agents N = [n], a set of alternatives A = {a1, . . . am}, a preference profile V
of the agents, a sequence (w1, . . . , wn) of agents’ weights, sequences (capa1 , . . . , capam) and
(ca1 , . . . , cam) of alternatives’ capacities and costs, respectively, and budget B ∈ N. We ask
for the assignment function Φ such that:
1. cost(Φ) ≤ B,
2. ∀a∈A
∑
i:Φ(i)=a wi ≤ capa, and
3. ℓα1 (Φ) is minimized.
In other words, in α-Assignment-Inc we ask for a feasible assignment that minimizes
the total dissatisfaction of the agents without exceeding the budget.
Problem α-Assignment-Dec is defined identically except that α is a normal DPSF and
in the third condition we seek to maximize ℓα1 (Φ) (that is, in α-Assignment-Dec our goal
5
is to maximize total satisfaction). If we replace ℓα1 with ℓ
α
∞ in α-Assignment-Inc then we
obtain problem α-Minmax-Assignment-Inc, where we seek to minimize the dissatisfaction
of the most dissatisfied agent. If we replace ℓα1 with min
α in α-Assignment-Dec then we
obtain problem α-Minmax-Assignment-Dec, where we seek to maximize the satisfaction
of the least satisfied agent.
As far as optimal solutions go, satisfaction and dissatisfaction formulations of our prob-
lems are equivalent. However, as we will see, there are striking differences in terms of their
approximability.
Clearly, each of our four Assignment problems is NP-complete: Even without costs
they reduce to the standard NP-complete Partition problem, where we ask if a set of
integers (in our case these integers would be agents’ weights) can be split evenly between
two sets (in our case, two alternatives with the capacities equal to half of the total agent
weight). However, in very many applications (for example, in the sport classes example
from the introduction) it suffices to consider unit-weight agents. Thus, from now on we
assume the agents have unit weights.
Our four problems can be viewed as generalizations of Monroe’s [20] and Chamberlin
and Courant’s [8] multiwinner voting systems (see the introduction for their definitions).
To model Monroe’s system, it suffices to set the budget B = K, the cost of each alternative
to be 1, and the capacity of each alternative to be ‖N‖
K
(for simplicity, throughout the paper
we assume that K divides ‖N‖). We will refer to thus restricted variants of our problems
as Monroe-Assignment variants. To represent Chamberlin and Courant’s system within
our framework, it suffices to take the same restrictions as for Monroe’s system, except that
each alternative has capacity equal to ‖N‖. We will refer to thus restricted variants of our
problems as CC-Assignment variants.
The eight above-defined special cases of our resource allocation problem were, in var-
ious forms and shapes, considered by Procaccia, Rosenschein, and Zohar [25], Lu and
Boutilier [19], and Betzler, Slinko and Uhlmann [4].
Computational Complexity, Approximation Algorithms. For many normal IPSFs
α (and, in particular, for Borda count), even the above-mentioned restricted versions
of the original problem, namely, α-Monroe-Assignment-Inc, α-Minmax-Monroe-
Assignment-Inc, α-CC-Assignment-Inc, and α-Minmax-CC-Assignment-Inc are
NP-complete [4,25] (the same holds for normal DPSFs and Dec variants of the problems).
Thus, we explore possibilities for approximate solutions.
Definition 2. Let β be a real number such that β ≥ 1 (0 < β ≤ 1) and let α be a normal
IPSF (a normal DPSF). An algorithm is a β-approximation algorithm for α-Assignment-
Inc problem (for α-Assignment-Dec problem) if on each instance I it returns a feasible
assignment Φ that meets the budget restriction and such that ℓα1 (Φ) ≤ β · OPT (and such
that ℓα1 (Φ) ≥ β ·OPT), where OPT is the aggregated dissatisfaction (satisfaction) ℓ
α
1 (ΦOPT)
of the optimal assignment ΦOPT.
We define β-approximation algorithms for the Minmax variants of our problems anal-
ogously. For example, Lu and Boutilier [19] present a (1− 1
e
)-approximation algorithm for
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the case of CC-Assignment-Dec.
Throughout this paper, we will consider each of the Monroe-Assignment and CC-
Assignment variants of the problem and for each we will either prove inapproximability
with respect to any constant β (under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions) or we
will show an approximation algorithm. In our inapproximability proofs, we will use the
following classic NP-complete problems [14].
Definition 3. An instance I of Set-Cover consists of set U = [n] (called the ground set),
family F = {F1, F2, . . . , Fm} of subsets of U , and positive integer K. We ask if there exists
a set I ⊆ [m] such that ‖I‖ ≤ K and
⋃
i∈I Fi = U .
Definition 4. Vertex-Cover is a special case of Set-Cover, where U and F are con-
structed from a given graph G. Specifically, U is the set of G’s edges and F = {F1, . . . , Fn}
corresponds to G’s vertices (for each vertex v of G, F has a corresponding set F , which
contains the edges incident to v).
Definition 5. X3C is a special case of Set-Cover where ‖U‖ is divisible by 3, each
member of F has exactly three elements, and K = n3 .
Note that X3C remains NP-complete even if we additionally assume that n is divisible
by 2 and each member of U appears in at most 3 sets from F [14].
3 Hardness of Approximation
In this section we present our inapproximability results for Monroe-Assignment and
CC-Assignment variants of the resource allocation problem. In particular, we show that
if we focus on voter dissatisfaction (i.e., on the Inc variants) then for each β > 1, neither
Monroe’s nor Chamberlin and Courant’s system has a polynomial-time β-approximation
algorithm. Further, we show that analogous results hold if we focus on the satisfaction of
the least satisfied voter.
Naturally, these inapproximability results carry over to more general settings. In particu-
lar, unless P = NP, there are no polynomial-time constant-factor approximation algorithms
for the general resource allocation problem for the case where we focus on voter dissatisfac-
tion. On the other hand, our results do not preclude good approximation algorithms for the
case where we measure agents’ total satisfaction. Indeed, in Section 4 we derive algorithms
for several satisfaction-based special cases of the problem.
We start by showing that for each normal IPSF α there is no constant-factor polynomial-
time approximation algorithm for α-Monroe-Assignment-Inc (and, thus, there is no such
algorithm for general α-Assignment-Inc).
Theorem 1. For each normal IPSF α and each constant factor β, β > 1, there is no
polynomial-time β-approximation algorithm for α-Monroe-Assignment-Inc unless P =
NP.
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Proof. Let us fix a normal IPSF α and let us assume, for the sake of contradiction, that
there is some constant β, β > 1, and a polynomial-time β-approximation algorithm A for
α-Monroe-Assignment-Inc.
Let I be an instance of X3C with ground set U = [n] and family F = {F1, F2, . . . , Fm}
of 3-element subsets of U . W.l.o.g., we assume that n is divisible by both 2 and 3 and that
each member of U appears in at most 3 sets from F .
Given I, we build instance IM of α-Monroe-Assignment-Inc as follows. We set
N = U (that is, the elements of the ground set are the agents) and we set A = A1 ∪ A2,
where A1 = {a1, . . . , am} is a set of alternatives corresponding to the sets from the family
F and A2, ‖A2‖ =
n2·α(3)·β
2 , is a set of dummy alternatives needed for our construction.
We let m′ = ‖A2‖ and we rename the alternatives in A2 so that A2 = {b1, . . . , bm′}. We set
K = n3 .
We build agents’ preference orders using the following algorithm. For each j ∈ N , set
Mf (j) = {ai | j ∈ Fi} and Ml = {ai | j 6∈ Fi}. Set mf (j) = ‖Mf (j)‖ and ml(j) = ‖Ml(j)‖;
as the frequency of the elements from U is bounded by 3, mf (j) ≤ 3. For each agent j
we set his or her preference order to be of the form Mf (j) ≻j A2 ≻j Ml(j), where the
alternatives in Mf (j) and Ml(j) are ranked in an arbitrary way and the alternatives from
A2 are placed at positions mf (j)+1, . . . ,mf (j)+m
′ in the way described below (see Figure
1 for a high-level illustration of the construction).
We place the alternatives from A2 in the preference orders of the agents in such a way
that for each alternative bi ∈ A2 there are at most two agents that rank bi among their
n·α(3)·β top alternatives. The following construction achieves this effect. If (i+j)mod n <
2, then alternative bi is placed at one of the positions mf (j) + 1, . . . ,mf (j) + n · α(3) · β in
j’s preference order. Otherwise, bi is placed at a position with index higher than mf (j) +
n · α(3) · β (and, thus, at a position higher than n · α(3) · β). This construction can be
implemented because for each agent j there are exactly m′ · 2
n
= n · α(3) · β alternatives
bi1 , bi2 , binα(3)β such that (ik + j)modn < 2.
Let Φ be an assignment computed by A on IM . We will show that ℓ
α
1 (Φ) ≤ n · α(3) · β
if and only if I is a yes-instance of X3C.
(⇐) If there exists a solution for I (i.e., an exact cover of U with n3 sets from F), then
we can easily show an assignment in which each agent j is assigned to an alternative from
the top mf (j) positions of his or her preference order (namely, one that assigns each agent
j to the alternative ai ∈ A1 that corresponds to the set Fi, from the exact cover of U , that
contains j). Thus, for the optimal assignment ΦOPT it holds that ℓ
α
1 (ΦOPT) ≤ α(3) · n. In
consequence, A must return an assignment with the total dissatisfaction at most n ·α(3) ·β.
(⇒) Let us now consider the opposite direction. We assume that A found an assignment
Φ such that ℓα1 (Φ) ≤ n ·α(3) ·β and we will show that I is a yes-instance of X3C. Since we
require each alternative to be assigned to either 0 or 3 agents, if some alternative bi from
A2 were assigned to some 3 agents, at least one of them would rank him or her at a position
worse than n ·α(3) ·β. This would mean that ℓα1 (Φ) ≥ n ·α(3) ·β+1. Analogously, no agent
j can be assigned to an alternative that is placed at one of the ml(j) bottom positions of
j’s preference order. Thus, only the alternatives in A1 have agents assigned to them and,
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bb
b
mf 3 m+m′ −ml
Agent 1:
Agent 2:
Agent 3:
Agent 4:
Agent 5:
Agent 6:
Agent n:
The alternatives from the second group
nα(3)β
m+m′ = m+ n
2·α(3)·β
C−1 positions
mf + nα(3)β
Figure 1: The alignment of the positions in the preference orders of the agents. The positions
are numbered from the left to the right. The left wavy line shows the positions mf (·), each
no greater than 3. The right wavy line shows the positionsml(·), each higher than n·α(3)·β.
The alternatives from A2 (positions of one such an alternative is illustrated with the circle)
are placed only between the peripheral wavy lines. Each alternative from A2 is placed on
the left from the middle wavy line exactly 2 times, thus each such alternative is placed on
the left from the right dashed line no more than 2 times (exactly two times at the figure).
further, if agents x, y, z, are assigned to some ai ∈ A1, then it holds that Fi = {x, y, z}
(we will call each set Fi for which alternative ai is assigned to some agents x, y, z selected).
Since each agent is assigned to exactly one alternative, the selected sets are disjoint. Since
the number of selected sets is K = n3 , it must be the case that the selected sets form an
exact cover of U . Thus, I is a yes-instance of X3C.
One may wonder if hardness of approximation for α-Monroe-Assignment-Inc is not
an artifact of the strict requirements regarding the budget. It turns out that unless P =
NP, there is no β-γ-approximation algorithm that finds an assignment with the following
properties: (1) the aggregated dissatisfaction ℓα1 (Φ) is at most β times higher than the
optimal one, (2) the number of alternatives to which agents are assigned is at most γK
and (3) each selected alternative (the alternative that has agents assigned), is assigned to
no more than γ⌈ n
K
⌉ and no less than 1
γ
⌈ n
K
⌉ agents. (The proof is similar to the one used
for Theorem 1.) Thus, in our further study we do not consider relaxations of the budget
constraints.
Theorem 2. For each normal IPSF α and each constant β, β > 1, there is no polynomial-
time β-approximation algorithm for α-Minmax-Monroe-Assignment-Inc unless P =
NP.
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Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 applies to this case as well. (In fact, it even suffices to take
m′ = ‖A2‖ =
n·α(3)·β
2 ).
Results analogous to Theorems 1 and 2 hold for the CC-Assginment-Inc family of
problems as well.
Theorem 3. For each normal IPSF α and each constant factor β, β > 1, there is no
polynomial-time β-approximation algorithm for α-CC-Assignment-Inc unless P = NP.
Proof. Let us fix a normal IPSF α. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there
is some constant β, β > 1, and a β-approximation algorithm A for α-CC-Assignment-
Inc. We will show that it is possible to use A to solve the NP-complete Vertex-Cover
problem.
Let I = (U,F ,K) be an instance of Vertex-Cover, where U = [n] is the ground set,
F = {F1, . . . , Fm} is a family of subsets of U (where each member of U belongs to exactly
two sets in F), and K is a positive integer.
Given I, we construct an instance ICC of α-CC-Assignment-Inc in the following way:
The set of agents is N = U and the set of alternatives is A =
⋃m
j=1Aj, where each Aj
contains exactly α(2) · β · n (unique) alternatives. Intuitively, for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the
alternatives in Aj correspond to the set Fj . For each Aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we pick one alternative,
which we denote aj. For each agent i ∈ N , we set i’s preference order as follows: Let Fj
and Fk, j < k, be the two sets that contain i. Agent i’s preference order is of the form
aj ≻i ak ≻i Ak − {ak} ≻i A − (Ak ∪ {aj , ak}) (the particular order of alternatives in the
sets Ak − {ak} and A − (Ak ∪ {aj , ak}) is irrelevant for the construction). We ask for an
assignment of the agents to at most K alternatives.
Let us consider a solution Φ returned by A on input ICC . We claim that ℓ
α
1 (Φ) ≤
n · α(2) · β if and only if I is a yes-instance of Vertex-Cover.
(⇐) If I is a yes-instance then, clearly, each agent i can be assigned to one of the top two
alternatives in his or her preference order (if there is a size-K cover, then this assignment
selects at most K candidates). Thus the total dissatisfaction of an optimal assignment is
at most α(2) ·n. As a result, the solution Φ returned by A has total dissatisfaction at most
α(2) · β · n.
(⇒) If A returns an assignment with total dissatisfaction no greater than α(2) · β · n,
then, by the construction of agents preference orders, we see that each agent i was assigned
to an alternative from a set Aj such that i ∈ Fj . Since the assignment can use at most K
alternatives, this directly implies that there is a size-K cover of U with sets from F .
Theorem 4. For each normal IPSF α and each constant factor β, β > 1, there is no
polynomial-time β-approximation algorithm for α-Minmax-CC-Assignment-Inc unless
P = NP.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3 works correctly in this case as well. In fact, it even suffices
to take the m groups of alternatives, A1, . . . , Am, to contain α(2) · β alternatives each.
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The above results show that approximating the minimal dissatisfaction of agents is dif-
ficult. On the other hand, if we focus on agents’ total satisfaction then constant-factor
approximation exist in many cases (see, e.g., the work of Lu and Boutilier [19] and the next
section). Yet, if we focus on the satisfaction of the least satisfied voter, there are no efficient
constant-factor approximation algorithms for Monroe’s and Courant and Chamberlin’s sys-
tems. (However, note that our result for the Monroe setting is more general than the result
for the Chamberlin-Courant setting; the latter is for the Borda DPSF only.)
Theorem 5. For each normal DPSF α (where each entry is polynomially bounded in the
number of alternatives) and each constant factor β, 0 < β ≤ 1, there is no β-approximation
algorithm for α-Minmax-Monroe-Assignment-Dec unless P = NP.
Proof. Let us fix a DPSF α where each entry is polynomially bounded in the number of
alternatives. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that for some β, 0 < β ≤ 1,
there is a β-approximation algorithm A for α-Minmax-Monroe-Assignment-Dec. We
will show that the existence of this algorithm implies that X3C is solvable in polynomial
time.
Let I be an X3C instance with ground set U = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a collection F =
{F1, . . . , Fm} of subsets of U . Each set in F has cardinality three. Further, w.l.o.g., we can
assume that n is divisible by three and that each i ∈ U appears in at most three sets from
F . Given I, we form an instance IM of α-Minmax-Monroe-Assignment-Dec as follows.
Let n′ = 3 · (αm+1dec (1) · ⌈
1−β
β
⌉ + 3). The set N of agents is partitioned into two subsets,
N1 and N2. N1 contains n agents (intuitively, corresponding to the elements of the ground
set U) and N2 contains n
′ agents (used to enforce certain properties of the solution). The
set of alternatives A is partitioned into two subsets, A1 and A2. We set A1 = {a1, . . . , am}
(members of A1 correspond to the sets in F), and we set A2 = {b1, . . . , bm′}, wherem
′ = n
′
3 .
For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we set Mf (j) = {ai | j ∈ Fi}. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we set the
preference order of the j’th agent in N1 to be of the form
Mf (j) ≻ A2 ≻ A1 −Mf (j).
Note that by our assumptions, ‖Mf (j)‖ ≤ 3. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n
′, we set the preference
order of the j’th agent in N2 to be of the form
b⌈ j3⌉
≻ A2 − {b⌈ j3⌉
} ≻ A1.
Note that each agent in N2 ranks the alternatives from A1 in positions positions m
′ +
1, . . . ,m′ +m. Finally, we set the budget/number of candidates that can be selected, to be
K = n+n
′
3 .
Now, consider the solution Φ returned by A on IM . We will show that ℓ
αm+m
′
dec
∞ (Φ) ≤
βαm+m
′
dec (3) if and only if I is a yes-instance of X3C.
(⇐) If there exists an exact set cover of U with sets from F , then it is easy to construct
a solution for IM where the satisfaction of each agent is greater or equal to β · α
m+m′
dec (3).
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Let I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} be a set such that
⋃
i∈I Fi = U and ‖I‖ =
n
3 . We assign each agent
j from N1 to the alternative ai such that (a) i ∈ I and (b) j ∈ Fi, and we assign each
agent from N2 to his or her most preferred alternative. Thus, Algorithm A has to return
an assignment with the minimal satisfaction greater or equal to β · αm+m
′
dec (3).
(⇒) For the other direction, we first show that β ·αm+m
′
dec (3) ≥ α
m+m′
dec (m
′). Since DPSFs
are strictly decreasing, it holds that:
β · αm+m
′
dec (3) ≥ β · (α
m+m′
dec (m
′) +m′ − 3). (1)
Then, by the definition of DPSFs, it holds that:
αm+m
′
dec (m
′) = αm+1dec (1) (2)
Using the fact thatm′ = (αm+1dec (1)·⌈
1−β
β
⌉+3) and using (2), we can transform inequality (1)
to obtain the following:
β · αm+m
′
dec (3) ≥ β · (α
m+m′
dec (m
′) +m′ − 3)
= β ·
(
αm+m
′
dec (m
′) + (αm+1dec (1) ·
⌈
1− β
β
⌉
+ 3)− 3
)
≥ β · αm+m
′
dec (m
′) + (1− β) · αm+1dec (1)
= β · αm+m
′
dec (m
′) + (1− β) · αm+m
′
dec (m
′) = αm+m
′
dec (m
′).
This means that if the minimal satisfaction of an agent is at least β ·αm+m
′
dec (3), then no
agent was assigned to an alternative that he or she ranked beyond positionm′. If some agent
j from N1 were assigned to an alternative from A2, then, by the pigeonhole principle, some
agent from N2 were assigned to an alternative from A1. However, each agent in N2 ranks
the alternatives from A1 beyond position m
′ and thus such an assignment is impossible. In
consequence, it must be that each agent in j was assigned to an alternative that corresponds
to a set Fi in F that contains j. Such an assignment directly leads to a solution for I.
Let us now move on to the case of Minmax-CC-Assignment-Dec family of problems.
Unfortunately, in this case our inapproximability argument holds for the case of Borda
DPSF only (though we believe that it can be adapted to other DPSFs as well). Further,
in our previous theorems we were showing that existence of a respective constant-factor
approximation algorithm implies that NP collapses to P. In the following theorem we will
show a seemingly weaker collapse of W[2] to FPT.
Intuitively, FPT is a class of problems that can be solved in time f(k)nO(1), where
n is the size of the input instance, k is a so-called parameter (some quantity, typically
characterizing the difficulty of the instance), and f is some computable function. For
example, for the Set-Cover and Vertex-Cover problems one often takes K as the value
of the parameter. In the world of parametrized complexity, FPT is viewed as the class of
easy problems (analogous to the class P), whereas classes W[1] ⊆W[2] ⊆ · · · are believed to
form a hierarchy of classes of hard problems (somewhat analogous to the class NP). It holds
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that FPT ⊆W[1], but it seems unlikely that FPT = W[1], let alone FPT = W[2]. We point
the reader to the books of Niedermeier [21] and Flum and Grohe [13] for detailed overviews
of parametrized complexity theory. Interestingly, while both Set-Cover and Vertex-
Cover are NP-complete, the former is W[2]-complete and the latter belongs to FPT (see,
e.g., the book of Niedermeier [21] for these now-standard results and their history).
To prove hardness of approximation for αB,dec-Minmax-CC-Assignment-Dec, we first
prove the following simple lemma.
Lemma 6. Let K, p, l be three positive integers and let X be a set of cardinality lpK.
There exists a family S = {S1, . . . , S(lKK )
} of pK-element subsets of X such that for each
K-element subset B of X, there is a set Si ∈ S such that B ⊆ Si.
Proof. Set X ′ = [lK] and let Y ′ be a family of all K-element subsets of X ′. Replace each
element i of X ′ with p new elements (at the same time replacing i with the same p elements
within each set in Y ′ that contains i). As a result we obtain two new sets, X and Y , that
satisfy the statement of the theorem (up to the renaming of the elements).
Theorem 7. Let αmB,dec be the Borda DPSF (α
m
B,dec(i) = m−i). For each constant factor β,
0 < β ≤ 1, there is no β-approximation algorithm for αmB,dec-Minmax-CC-Assignment-
Dec unless FPT = W[2].
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there is some constant β, 0 < β ≤ 1,
and a polynomial-time β-approximation algorithm A for αmB,dec-Minmax-CC-Assignment-
Dec. We will show that the existence of this algorithm implies that Set-Cover is fixed-
parameter tractable for the parameter K (since Set-Cover is known to be W[2]-complete
for this parameter, this will imply FPT = W[2]).
Let I be an instance of Set-Cover with ground set U = [n] and family F =
{F1, F2, . . . , Fm} of subsets of U . Given I, we build an instance ICC of α
m
B,dec-Minmax-
CC-Assignment-Dec as follows. The set of agents N consists of n subsets of agents,
N1, . . . , Nn, where each group Ni contains exactly n
′ =
(⌈ 2
β
⌉
K
K
)
agents. Intuitively, for each
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the agents in the set Ni correspond to the element i in U . The set of alterna-
tives A is partitioned into two subsets, A1 and A2, such that A1 = {a1, . . . , am} is a set of
alternatives corresponding to the sets from the family F , and A2, ‖A2‖ =
⌈
2
β
⌉ ⌈
m(1+β)
K
⌉
K,
is a set of dummy alternatives needed for our construction. We set m′ = ‖A‖ = m+ ‖A2‖.
Before we describe the preference orders of the agents in N , we form a family R =
{r1, . . . , rn′} of preference orders over A2 that satisfies the following condition: For each K-
element subset B of A2, there exists rj in R such that all members of B are ranked among
the bottom
⌈
m(1+β)
K
⌉
K positions in rj. By Lemma 6, such a construction is possible (it
suffices to take l =
⌈
2
β
⌉
and p =
⌈
m(1+β)
K
⌉
); further, the proof of the lemma provides an
algorithmic way to construct R.
We form the preference orders of the agents as follows. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, set
Mf (i) = {at | i ∈ Ft}. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n
′, the j’th agent from Ni
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has preference order of the form:
Mf (i) ≻ rj ≻ A1 −Mf (i)
(we pick any arbitrary, polynomial-time computable order of candidates within Mf (i) and
Ml(i)).
Let Φ be an assignment computed byA on IM . We will show that ℓ
αm
′
B,dec
∞ (Φ) ≥ β·(m′−m)
if and only if I is a yes-instance of Set-Cover.
(⇐) If there exists a solution for I (i.e., a cover of U with K sets from F), then we
can easily show an assignment where each agent is assigned to an alternative that he or she
ranks among the top m positions (namely, for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we assign all the agents
from the set Nj to the alternative ai ∈ A1 such that j ∈ Fi and Fi belongs to the alleged
K-element cover of U). Under this assignment, the least satisfied agent’s satisfaction is at
least m′ −m and, thus, A has to return an assignment Φ where ℓ
αm
′
B,dec
∞ (Φ) ≥ β · (m′ −m).
(⇒) Let us now consider the opposite direction. We assume that A found an assignment
Φ such that ℓ
αmB,dec
∞ (Φ) ≥ β · (m′ − m) and we will show that I is a yes-instance of Set-
Cover. We claim that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, at least one agent j in Ni were assigned to an
alternative from A1. If all the agents in Ni were assigned to alternatives from A2, then, by
the construction of R, at least one of them would have been assigned to an alternative that he
or she ranks at a position greater than ‖A2‖−
⌈
m(1+β)
K
⌉
K =
⌈
2
β
⌉ ⌈
m(1+β)
K
⌉
K−
⌈
m(1+β)
K
⌉
K.
Since for x =
⌈
m(1+β)
K
⌉
K we have:
⌈
2
β
⌉
x− x ≥ m′ −m′β +mβ
(we skip the straightforward calculation). This means that this agent would have been
assigned to an alternative that he or she ranks at a position greater than m′ −m′β +mβ.
As a consequence, this agent’s satisfaction would be lower than (m′ −m)β. Similarly, no
agent from Ni can be assigned to an alternative from Ml(i). Thus, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
there exists at least one agent j ∈ Ni that is assigned to an alternative from Mf (i). In
consequence, the covering subfamily of F consists simply of those sets Fk, for which some
agent is assigned to alternative ak ∈ A1.
The presented construction gives the exact algorithm for Set-Cover problem running
in time f(K)(n + m)O(1), where f(K) is polynomial in
(⌈ 2
β
⌉
K
)
. The existence of such an
algorithm means that Set-Cover is in FPT. On the other hand, we know that Set-
Cover is W[2]-complete, and thus if A existed then FPT = W[2] would hold.
4 Approximation Algorithms
We now turn to approximation algorithms for Monroe’s and Chamberlin and Courant’s mul-
tiwinner voting rules (both of which are special cases of our resource allocation problem).
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Indeed, if one focuses on agents’ total satisfaction then it is possible to obtain high-quality
approximation results. In particular, we show the first nontrivial (randomized) approxi-
mation algorithm for αB,dec-Monroe-Assignment-Dec (for each ǫ > 0, we can provide a
randomized polynomial-time algorithm that achieves 0.715 − ǫ approximation ratio), and
the first polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for αB,dec-CC-Assignment-Dec.
These results stand in a sharp contrast to those from the previous section, where we have
shown that approximation is hard for essentially all remaining variants of the problem.
The core difficulty in solving α-Monroe/CC-Assignment problems lays in selecting
the alternatives that should be assigned to the agents. Given a preference profile and a set
A′ of K alternatives, using a standard network-flow argument, it is easy to match them
optimally to the agents.
Proposition 8 (Implicit in the paper of Betzler et al. [4]). Let α be a normal DPSF,
N be a set of agents, A be a set of alternatives, V be a preference profile of N over A, and
A′ a K-element subset of A (where K divides ‖N‖). There is a polynomial-time algorithm
that computes an optimal assignment Φ of the alternatives from A′ to the agents, both for
ℓα1 and for min
α, both for the case where each alternative in A′ should be assigned to the
same number of agents (Monroe’s case) and for the case without additional restrictions
(Chamberlin and Courant’s case).
Thus, in the algorithms in this section, we will focus on the issue of selecting the alter-
natives and not on the issue of matching them to the agents.
4.1 Monroe’s System
We first consider αB,dec-Monroe-Assignment-Dec. Perhaps the most natural approach
to solve this problem is to build a solution iteratively: In each step we pick some not-yet-
assigned alternative ai (using some criterion) and assign him or her to those ⌈
N
K
⌉ agents that
(a) are not assigned to any other alternative yet, and (b) whose satisfaction of being matched
with ai is maximal. It turns out that this idea, implemented formally in Algorithm 1, works
very well in many cases. We provide a lower bound on the total satisfaction it guarantees
in the next lemma. (For each positive integer k, we let Hk =
∑k
i=1
1
i
be the k’th harmonic
number. Recall that Hk = Θ(log k).)
Lemma 9. Algorithm 1 is a polynomial-time (1 − K−12(m−1) −
HK
K
)-approximation algorithm
for αB,dec-Monroe-Assignment-Dec.
Proof. Our algorithm computes an optimal solution for K ≤ 2. Thus we assumeK ≥ 3. Let
us consider the situation in the algorithm after the i’th iteration of the outer loop (we have
i = 0 if no iteration has been executed yet). So far, the algorithm has picked i alternatives
and assigned them to i n
K
agents (recall that for simplicity we assume that K divides n
evenly). Hence, each agent has ⌈m−i
K−i⌉ unassigned alternatives among his or her i + ⌈
m−i
K−i⌉
top-ranked alternatives. By pigeonhole principle, this means that there is an unassigned
alternative aℓ who is ranked among top i + ⌈
m−i
K−i⌉ positions by at least
n
K
agents. To see
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Algorithm 1: The algorithm for Monroe-Assignment.
Notation: Φ← a map defining a partial assignment, iteratively built by the algorithm.
Φ← ← the set of agents for which the assignment is already defined.
Φ→ ← the set of alternatives already used in the assignment.
if K ≤ 2 then
compute the optimal solution using an algorithm of Betzler et al. [4] and return.
Φ = {}
for i← 1 to K do
score← {}
bests← {}
foreach ai ∈ A \ Φ
→ do
agents← sort N \ Φ← so that j ≺ k in agents =⇒
posj(ai) ≤ posk(ai)
bests[ai]← chose first ⌈
N
K
⌉ elements from agents
score[ai]←
∑
j∈bests(m− posj(ai))
abest ← argmaxa∈A\Φ→score[a]
foreach j ∈ bests[abest] do
Φ[j]← abest
this, note that there are (n − i n
K
)⌈m−i
K−i⌉ slots for unassigned alternatives among the top
i+ ⌈m−i
K−i⌉ positions in the preference orders of unassigned agents, and that there are m− i
unassigned alternatives. As a result, there must be an alternative aℓ for whom the number
of agents that rank him or her among the top i+ ⌈m−i
K−i⌉ positions is at least:
1
m− i
(
(n− i
n
K
)⌈
m− i
K − i
⌉
)
≥
n
m− i
(
K − i
K
)(
m− i
K − i
)
=
n
K
.
In consequence, the ⌈ n
K
⌉ agents assigned in the next step of the algorithm will have the
total satisfaction at least ⌈ n
K
⌉ · (m− i− ⌈m−i
K−i⌉). Thus, summing over the K iterations, the
total satisfaction guaranteed by the assignment Φ computed by Algorithm 1 is at least the
following value (see the comment below for the fourth inequality; for the last inequality we
assume K ≥ 3):
ℓ
αb
1 (Φ) ≥
K−1∑
i=0
n
K
·
(
m− i− ⌈
m− i
K − i
⌉
)
≥
K−1∑
i=0
n
K
·
(
m− i−
m− i
K − i
− 1
)
=
K∑
i=1
n
K
·
(
m− i−
m− 1
K − i+ 1
+
i− 2
K − i+ 1
)
=
n
K
(
K(2m−K − 1)
2
− (m− 1)HK +K(HK − 1)−HK
)
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= (m− 1)n
(
1−
K − 1
2(m− 1)
−
HK
K
+
HK − 1
m− 1
−
HK
K(m− 1)
)
> (m− 1)n
(
1−
K − 1
2(m− 1)
−
HK
K
)
The fourth equality holds because:
K(HK − 1)−HK =
K∑
i=1
(
K
i
− 1
)
−HK =
K∑
i=1
(
K
K − i+ 1
− 1
)
−HK
=
K∑
i=1
i− 1
K − i+ 1
−HK =
K∑
i=1
i− 2
K − i+ 1
.
If each agent were assigned to his or her top alternative, the total satisfaction would be
equal to (m− 1)n. Thus we get the following bound:
ℓ
αB,dec
1 (Φ)
OPT
≤ 1−
K − 1
2(m− 1)
−
HK
K
.
This completes the proof.
Note that in the above proof we measure the quality of our assignment against a perhaps-
impossible, perfect solution, where each agent is assigned to his or her top alternative. This
means that for relatively large m and K, and small K
m
ratio, the algorithm can achieve a
close-to-ideal solution irrespective of the voters’ preference orders. We believe that this is
an argument in favor of using Monroe’s system in multiwinner elections. On the flip side,
to obtain a better approximation ratio, we would have to use a more involved bound on
the quality of the optimal solution. To see that this is the case, form an instance I of
αB,dec-Monroe-Assignment-Dec with n agents and m alternatives, where all the agents
have the same preference order, and where the budget is K (and where K divides n). It is
easy to see that each solution that assigns the K universally top-ranked alternatives to the
agents is optimal. Thus the total dissatisfaction of the agents in the optimal solution is:
n
K
((m− 1) + · · ·+ (m−K)) =
n
K
(
K(2m−K − 1)
2
)
= n(m− 1)
(
1−
K − 1
2(m− 1)
)
.
By taking large enough m and K (even for a fixed value of m
K
), the fraction 1 − K−12(m−1)
can be arbitrarily close to the approximation ratio of our algorithm (the reasoning here
is somewhat in spirit of the idea of identifying maximally robust elections, as studied by
Shiryaev, Yu, and Elkind [28]).
Betzler et al. [4] showed that for each fixed constant K, αB,dec-Monroe-Assignment-
Dec can be solved in polynomial time. Thus, for small values ofK for which the fraction HK
K
affects the approximation guarantees of Algorithm 1 too much, we can use this polynomial-
time algorithm to find an optimal solution. This means that we can essentially disregard the
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HK
K
part of Algorithm 1’s approximation ratio. In consequence, the quality of the solution
produced by Algorithm 1 most strongly depends on the ratio K−1
m−1 . In most cases we can
expect it to be small (for example, in Polish parliamentary elections K = 460 andm ≈ 6000;
in this case the greedy algorithm’s approximation ratio is about 0.96). For the remaining
cases, for example, whenK > m2 , we can use a simple sampling-based randomized algorithm
described below.
The idea of this algorithm is to randomly pick K alternatives and match them optimally
to the agents, using Proposition 8. Naturally, such an algorithm might be very unlucky and
pick K alternatives that all of the agents rank low. Yet, if K is large relative to m then it is
likely that such a random sample would include a large chunk of some optimal solution. In
the lemma below, we asses the expected satisfaction obtained with a single sampling step
(relative to the satisfaction given by the optimal solution) and the probability that a single
sampling step gives satisfaction close to the expected one. Naturally, in practice one should
try several sampling steps and pick the one with the highest satisfaction.
Lemma 10. A single sampling step of the randomized algorithm for αB,dec-Monroe-
Assignment-Dec achieves expected approximation ratio of 12(1+
K
m
− K
2
m2−m
+ K
3
m3−m2
). Let
pǫ denote the probability that the relative deviation between the obtained total satisfaction
and the expected total satisfaction is higher than ǫ; for K ≥ 8 we have pǫ ≤ exp
(
−Kǫ
2
128
)
.
Proof. Let N = [n] be the set of agents, A = {a1, . . . , am} be the set of alternatives, and V
be the preference profile of the agents. Let us fix some optimal solution Φopt and let Aopt be
the set of alternatives assigned to the agents in this solution. For each ai ∈ Aopt, we write
sat(ai) to denote the total satisfaction of the agents assigned to ai in Φopt. Naturally, we
have
∑
a∈Aopt
sat(a) = OPT. In a single sampling step, we choose uniformly at random a
K-element subset B of A. Then, we form a solution ΦB by matching the alternatives in B
optimally to the agents (via Proposition 8). We write Kopt to denote the random variable
equal to ‖Aopt ∩ B‖, the number of sampled alternatives that belong to Aopt. We define
pi = Pr(Kopt = i). For each j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, we write Xj to denote the random variable
equal to the total satisfaction of the agents assigned to the j’th alternative from the sample.
We claim that for each i, 0 ≤ i ≤ K, it holds that:
E

 K∑
j=1
Xj |Kopt = i

 ≥ i
K
OPT+
m− i− 1
2
· (n− i
n
K
).
Why is this so? Given sample B that contains i members of Aopt, our algorithm’s solution
is at least as good as a solution that matches the alternatives from B∩Aopt in the same way
as Φopt, and the alternatives from B −Aopt in a random manner. Since Kopt = i and each
aj ∈ Aopt has equal probability of being in the sample, it is easy to see that the expected
value of
∑
aj∈B∩Aopt
sat(aj) is
i
K
OPT. After we allocate the agents from B ∩Aopt, each of
the remaining, unassigned agents has m − i positions in his or her preference order where
he ranks the agents from A − Aopt. For each unassigned agents, the average score value
associated with these positions is at least m−i−12 (this is so, because in the worst case the
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agent could rank the alternatives from B ∩Aopt in the top i positions). There are (n− i
n
K
)
such not yet assigned agents and so the expected total satisfaction from assigning them
randomly to the alternatives is m−i−12 · (n − i
n
K
). This proves our bound on the expected
satisfaction of a solution yielded by optimally matching a random sample of K alternatives.
Since OPT is upper bounded by (m − 1)n (consider a possibly-nonexistent solution
where every agent is assigned to his or her top preference), we get that:
E

 K∑
j=1
Xj |Kopt = i

 ≥ i
K
OPT+
m− i− 1
2(m− 1)
· (1−
i
K
)OPT.
We can compute the unconditional expected satisfaction of ΦB as follows:
E

 K∑
j=1
Xj

 = K∑
i=0
pi E

 K∑
j=1
Xj |Kopt = i


≥
K∑
i=0
pi
(
i
K
OPT+
m− i− 1
2(m− 1)
· (1−
i
K
)OPT
)
.
Since
∑K
i=1 pi ·i is the expected number of the alternatives in Aopt, we have that
∑K
i=1 pi ·i =
K2
m
. (one can think of summing the expected values of K indicator random variables; one for
each element of Aopt, taking the value 1 if a given alternative is selected and taking the value
0 otherwise). Further, from the generalized mean inequality we obtain
∑K
i=1 pi ·i
2 ≥
(
K2
m
)2
.
In consequence, through routine calculation, we get that:
E

 K∑
j=1
Xj

 ≥ (K
m
OPT+
m2 −K2 −m
2m(m− 1)
·
(
1−
K
m
)
OPT
)
=
OPT
2
(
1 +
K
m
−
K2
m2 −m
+
K3
m3 −m2
)
.
It remains to assess the probability that the total satisfaction obtained through ΦB is
close to its expected value. Since Xj ∈ 〈0,
(m−1)n
K
〉, from Hoeffding’s inequality we get:
pǫ = Pr


∣∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
j=1
Xj − E(
K∑
j=1
Xj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫE(
K∑
j=1
Xj)


≤ exp
(
−
2ǫ2(E(
∑K
j=1Xj))
2
K( (m−1)n
K
)2
)
= exp
(
−
Kǫ2(E(
∑K
j=1Xj))
2
((m− 1)n)2
)
We note that since K
m
− K
2
m2−m
≥ 0, our previous calculations show that E(
∑K
j=1Xj) ≥
OPT
2 .
Further, for K ≥ 8, Lemma 9 (and the fact that in its proof we upper-bound OPT to be
(m− 1)n) gives that OPT ≥ mn8 . Thus pǫ ≤ exp
(
−Kǫ
2
128
)
. This completes the proof.
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The threshold for K
m
, where the randomized algorithm is (in expectation) better than the
greedy algorithm is about 0.57. Thus, by combining the two algorithms, we can guarantee
an expected approximation ratio of 0.715 − ǫ, for each fixed constant ǫ. The pseudo-code
of the combination of the two algorithms is presented in Algorithm 2.
Theorem 11. For each fixed ǫ, Algorithm 2 provides a (0.715− ǫ)-approximate solution for
the problem αB,dec-Monroe-Assignment-Dec with probability λ in time polynomial with
respect to the input instance size and − log(1− λ).
Proof. Let ǫ be a fixed constant. We are given an instance I of αB,dec-Monroe-
Assignment-Dec. If m ≤ 1 + 2
ǫ
, we solve I using a brute-force algorithm (note that
in this case the number of alternatives is at most a fixed constant). Similarly, if HK
K
≥ ǫ2
then we use the exact algorithm of Betzler et al. [4] for a fixed value of K (note that in this
case K is no greater than a certain fixed constant). We do the same if K ≤ 8.
On the other hand, if neither of the above conditions hold, we try both Algorithm 1
and a number of runs of the sampling-based algorithm. It is easy to check through routine
calculation that if HK
K
≤ ǫ2 and m > 1 +
2
ǫ
then Algorithm 1 achieves approximation ratio
no worse than (1 − K2m − ǫ). We run the sampling-based algorithm
−512 log(1−λ)
Kǫ2
times.
The probability that a single run fails to find a solution with approximation ratio at least
1
2(1 +
K
m
− K
2
m2−m
+ K
3
m3−m2
) − ǫ2 is p ǫ2 ≤ exp
(
− Kǫ
2
4·128
)
. Thus, the probability that at least
one run will find a solution with at least this approximation ratio is at least:
1− p
−512 log(1−λ)
Kǫ2
ǫ
2
= 1− exp
(
−
Kǫ2
4 · 128
·
−512 log(1− λ)
Kǫ2
)
= λ.
Since m ≤ 1 + 2
ǫ
, by routine calculation we see that the sampling-based algorithm with
probability λ finds a solution with approximation ratio at least 12 (1 +
K
m
− K
2
m2
+ K
3
m3
) − ǫ.
By solving the equality:
1
2
(
1 +
K
m
−
K2
m2
+
K3
m3
)
= 1−
K
2m
we can find the value of K
m
for which the two algorithms give the same approximation
ratio. By substituting x = K
m
we get equality 1 + x − x2 + x3 = 2 − x. One can calculate
that this equality has a single solution within 〈0, 1〉 and that this solution is x ≈ 0.57.
For this x both algorithms guarantee approximation ratio of 0.715 − ǫ. For x < 0.57 the
deterministic algorithm guarantees a better approximation ratio and for x > 0.57, the
randomized algorithm does better.
4.2 Chamberlin and Courant’s System
Let us now move on to the Chamberlin and Courant’s system. Since Chamberlin and
Courant’s system places fewer restrictions on the solution assignment than the Mon-
roe’s system, our algorithms for αB,dec-Monroe-Assignement-Dec can also be used
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Algorithm 2: The combination of two algorithms for Monroe-Assignment.
Notation: We use the same notation as in Algorithm 1; w(·) denotes the Lambert
W-Function.
Parameters: λ ← required probability of achieving the approximation ratio equal 0.715− ǫ
if HK
K
≥ ǫ2 or K ≤ 8 then
compute the optimal solution using an algorithm of Betzler et al. [4] and return.
if m ≤ 1 + 2
ǫ
then
compute the optimal solution using a simple brute force algorithm and return.
Φ1 ← solution returned by Algorithm 1
Φ2 ← run the sampling-based algorithm
−512 log(1−λ)
Kǫ2
times; select the assignment of the best
quality
return the better assignment among Φ1 and Φ2
Algorithm 3: The algorithm for CC-Assignment.
Notation: We use the same notation as in Algorithm 2;
num posx(a)← ‖{i ∈ [n] \ Φ
← : posi(a) ≤ x}‖ (the number of not-yet assigned
agents that rank alternative a in one of their first x positions)
Φ = {}
x = ⌈mw(K)
K
⌉
for i← 1 to K do
ai ← argmaxa∈A\Φ→num posx(a)
foreach j ∈ [n] \Φ← do
if posj(ai) < x then
Φ[j]← ai
foreach j ∈ A \ Φ← do
a← such server from Φ→ that ∀a′∈Φ→posj(a) ≤ posj(a
′)
Φ[j]← a
for αB,dec-CC-Assignement-Dec, improving upon the approximation algorithms of Lu
and Boutilier [19]. However, it turns out that the additional freedom of Chamberlin and
Courant’s system allows us to go even further, and to design a polynomial-time approxima-
tion scheme for αB,dec-CC-Assignement-Dec.
The idea of our algorithm (presented as Algorithm 3 below) is to compute a certain value
x and to greedily compute an assignment that (approximately) maximizes the number of
agents assigned to one of their top-x alternatives. If after this process some agent has no
alternative assigned, we assign him or her to his or her most preferred alternative from those
already picked. Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that this greedy strategy achieves high-
quality results. (Recall that for nonnegative real numbers, Lambert’s W function, w(x), is
defined to be the solution of the equality x = w(x)ew(x).)
Lemma 12. Algorithm 3 is a polynomial-time (1 − 2w(K)
K
)-approximation algorithm for
αB,dec-CC-Assignement-Dec.
Proof. Let x = mw(K)
K
. We will first give an inductive proof that, for each i, 0 ≤ i ≤ K,
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after the i’th iteration of the outer loop at most n(1− w(K)
K
)i agents are unassigned. Based
on this observation, we will derive the approximation ratio of our algorithm.
For i = 0, the inductive hypothesis holds because n(1 − w(K)
K
)0 = n. For each i, let
ni denote the number of unassigned agents after the i’th iteration. Thus, after the i’th
iteration there are ni unassigned agents, each with x unassigned alternatives among his or
her top-x ranked alternatives. As a result, at least one unassigned alternative is present in
at least nix
m−i of top-x positions of unassigned agents. This means that after the (i + 1)’st
iteration the number of unassigned agents is:
ni+1 ≤ ni −
nix
m− i
≤ ni
(
1−
x
m
)
= ni
(
1−
w(K)
K
)
.
If for a given i the inductive hypothesis holds, that is, if ni ≤ n
(
1− w(K)
K
)i
, then:
ni+1 ≤ n(1−
w(K)
K
)i(1−
w(K)
K
) = n(1−
w(K)
K
)i+1
Thus the hypothesis holds and, as a result, we have that:
nk ≤ n
(
1−
w(K)
K
)K
≤ n
(
1
e
)w(K)
=
nw(K)
K
.
Let Φ be the assignment computed by our algorithm. To compare it against the optimal
solution, it suffices to observe that the optimal solution has satisfaction at most OPT ≤
(m−1)n, that each agent selected during the first K steps has satisfaction at least m−x =
m− mw(K)
K
, and that the agents not assigned within the first K steps have satisfaction no
worse than 0. Thus it holds that:
ℓ
αB,dec
1 (Φ)
OPT
≥
(n− nw(K)
K
)(m− mw(K)
K
)
(m− 1)n
≥ (1−
w(K)
K
)(1 −
w(K)
K
) ≥ 1−
2w(K)
K
This completes the proof.
Since for each ǫ > 0 there is a value Kǫ such that for each K > Kǫ it holds that
2w(K)
K
< ǫ, and αB,dec-CC-Assignment problem can be solved optimally in polynomial
time for each fixed constant K(see the work of Betzler et al. [4]), there is a polynomial-time
approximation scheme (PTAS) for αB,dec-CC-Assignment (i.e., a family of algorithms such
that for each fixed β, 0 < β < 1, there is a polynomial-time β-approximation algorithm for
αB,dec-CC-Assignment in the family; note that in PTASes we measure the running time
by considering β to be a fixed constant).
Theorem 13. There is a PTAS for αB,dec-CC-Assignment.
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Monroe Chamberlin and Courant General model
dissat. satisfaction dissat. satisfaction dissat. satisfaction
u
tilita
ria
n
Inapprox.
Theorem 1
Results for Borda only.
randomized algorithm:
(a) 0.715 − ǫ;
(b)
1+ K
m
− K
2
m2−m
+ K
3
m3−m2
2
−ǫ
deterministic algorithm:
1− K−1
2(m−1)
− ǫ
Inapprox.
Theorem 3
for Borda:
PTAS
(Sec. 4.2);
for general
PSF:
( e−1
e
) [19]
Inapprox.
Theorem 1
Theorem 3
Open prob-
lem
eg
a
l.
Inapprox.
Theorem 2
Inapprox.
Theorem 5
Inapprox.
Theorem 4
Inapprox.
Theorem 7
Inapprox.
Theorem 2
Theorem 4
Inapprox.
Theorem 5
Theorem 7
Table 1: Summary of approximation results fo Monroe’s and Chamberlin-Courant’s multi-
winner voting systems and for our general resource allocation problem.
The idea used in Algorithm 3 can also be used to address a generalized Minmax-CC-
Assignment-Dec problem. We can consider the following relaxation of Minmax-CC-
Assignment-Dec: Instead of requiring that each agent’s satisfaction is lower-bounded by
some value, we ask that the satisfactions of a significant majority of the agents are lower-
bounded by a given value. More formally, for a given constant δ, we introduce an additional
quality metric:
α
min
δ
(Φ) = max
N ′⊆N : ||N||−||N
′||
||N||
≤δ
mini∈N ′α(posi(Φ(i))).
For a given 0 < δ < 1, by putting x = −m ln(δ)
K
, we get (1 + ln(δ)
K
)-approximation algorithm
for the minαδ (Φ) metric.
It would also be natural to try a sampling-based approach to solving αB,dec-CC-
Assignement-Dec, just as we did for the Monroe variant. Indeed, as recently (and in-
dependently) observed by Oren [23], this leads to a randomized algorithm with expected
approximation ratio of (1− 1
K+1)(1 +
1
m
).
5 Conclusions
We have defined a certain resource allocation problem and have shown that it generalizes
multiwinner voting rules of Monroe and of Chamberlin and Courant. Since it is known that
these voting rules are hard to compute [4,19,25], we focused on approximation properties of
our problems. We have shown that if we focus on agents’ dissatisfaction then our problems
are hard to approximate up to any constant factor. The same holds for the case where
we focus on least satisfied agent’s satisfaction. However, for the case of optimizing total
satisfaction, we have shown good approximate solutions for the special cases of the resource
allocation problem pertaining to Monroe’s and Chamberlin and Courant’s voting systems.
In particular, we have shown a randomized algorithm that for Monroe’s system achieves
approximation ratio arbitrarily close to 0.715, and for Chamberlin and Courant’s system
23
we have shown a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS). Table 1 summarizes the
presented results. The most pressing, natural open question is whether there is a PTAS for
Monroe’s system. We plan to address the problem of finding approximate solution in the
general framework for the case of optimizing total satisfaction and to empirically verify the
quality of our algorithms.
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